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Religiosity and Cross-Country Differences in Trade Credit Use 
1. Introduction 
Trade credit arises when suppliers deliver goods to customers who do not pay immediately 
but promise to pay later. It is an important type of informal financing offered by suppliers to their 
customers and is usually a part of the commercial condition of a sale (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Fisman and Love, 2003). Typically, there is no collateral 
standing behind the transaction and no guarantees from third parties or financial intermediaries. 
Trade credit is generally non-interest bearing, which is important for certain religions (e.g., Islam) 
that prohibit dealing with interest.1 Like suppliers of institutional finance (e.g., banks), suppliers 
of trade credit face the future default risk of customers. As such, human belief is crucial in the 
decisions of granting and receiving trade credit. 
In this study, we investigate whether religiosity explains cross-country variation in trade 
credit use. Religiosity refers to “customary beliefs and values” transmitted by religious groups 
from generation to generation (Guiso et al., 2006). Prior literature shows that religiosity influences 
economic outcomes through its impact on individuals’ values and beliefs (Barro and McCleary, 
2003; McCleary and Barro, 2006). Given that religiosity is a major source of morality and ethical 
behavior (e.g., Grullon et al., 2010; Callen and Fang, 2015), we argue that religiosity constrains 
the opportunistic and default-prone behaviors of customers, which provides suppliers with higher 
incentives to supply trade credit. Additionally, prior literature documents that religiosity is 
positively associated with risk aversion behaviors (e.g., Hilary and Hui, 2009). As such, due to the 
presence of information asymmetry regarding the product quality, risk-averse customers tend to 
                                                          
1 We thank an anonymous referee for making this excellent point.  
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demand trade credit as an implicit assurance of product quality. Thus, we posit that religiosity in 
a country shapes the extent of trade credit use in that country. 
We adopt the cross-country setting since such a setting provides more variation in 
religiosity across countries. Specifically, we use a sample of 248,824 firm-year observations over 
a maximum period of 1989-2012 from 53 countries and control for firm- and country-level factors 
as well as industry and year effects. We find that firms located in more religious countries tend to 
use more trade credit. Moreover, we find that stronger creditor rights in a country, as well as higher 
social trust in the country, enhance the positive association between religiosity and trade credit use, 
while better disclosure quality in a country mitigates the aforementioned positive association. 
To mitigate the endogeneity concerns that our results may fail to control for institutional 
factors that determine both religiosity and trade credit use, we instrumentalize our religiosity 
measures with a country’s shares of adherents to different religions in each country. The effect of 
religiosity on trade credit use continues to hold in the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regression. 
We further adopt an exogenous shock setting in a subsample analysis and obtain consistent results. 
Moreover, to distinguish firm-level from country-level effects, we conduct country-level 
regressions and find similar results. Finally, the results hold after we employ alternative measures 
of religiosity or after we make alternative sampling requirements.   
Our paper contributes to several streams of research. First, our paper provides new 
evidence on the importance of religiosity in explaining economic decisions and outcomes, thus 
supporting the related work of Stulz and Williamson (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006). 
Specifically, our paper documents a new factor determining firms’ trade credit policies in a cross-
country setting. Using the firm-level data, we contribute to this stream of literature by showing 
that national religiosity, as an extra-legal country-level institution, is crucial in shaping trade credit 
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use in our sample countries. The effect of religiosity on trade credit use is over and above that of 
the previously documented country- and firm-level determinants of trade credit use. 
Second, our study complements the literature on the mechanisms that facilitate firms to 
access financing. Extra-legal institutions, such as social norms, culture, and governance 
mechanisms based on reputation and relationships, enable firms to overcome institutional barriers 
to various sources of funding, including informal financing such as trade credit (e.g., Fisman and 
Love, 2003; Cull et al., 2009; El Ghoul and Zheng, 2016). Our study shows that religiosity, as 
another extra-legal institution, fosters the prevalence of trade credit for firms that likely face 
restrictions in formal financing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our main 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data and variables. Section 4 presents the descriptive statistics 
and the main empirical analysis. Section 5 reports the results of the robustness tests. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Effect of national religiosity on firms’ trade credit use  
Trade credit is a short-term informal financing instrument used by suppliers and their 
customers. In this section, we argue that religiosity prompts suppliers to offer more trade credits 
to customers, and further, religiosity allows customers to pay off trade credits in a timely manner.  
Recent literature links religious adherence to lower risk-taking (e.g., Hilary and Hui, 2009; 
McGuire et al., 2012; Noussair et al., 2013). For example, Bartke and Schwarze (2008) show that 
religious people in Germany are less risk-tolerant than atheists. Using a sample of religious people 
from the Netherlands, Noussair et al. (2013) provide confirmatory evidence that religious people, 
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as measured by church membership or attendance, are risk-averse. Similarly, Hilary and Hui (2009) 
find that firms located in counties with higher levels of religiosity display lower degrees of risk 
exposure (as measured by variances in equity returns or in return on assets). The above studies 
suggest that customers from more religious countries demand more assurance of product quality 
when facing information asymmetry at the time of purchase. The risk-aversion tendency of 
customers motivates suppliers to offer more trade credits to provide implicit warranties on their 
products (Smith, 1987; Lee and Stowe, 1993; Long et al., 1993).  
However, suppliers offering trade credits face the future default risk of customers. Unlike 
banks, suppliers typically have a relatively small number of customers and cannot easily diversify 
their risks. Furthermore, information asymmetry between suppliers and customers would 
potentially accentuate the default risk of customers (Aktas et al., 2012). When customers cannot 
pay their payables within the normal credit period, the payables become overdue. The subsequent 
default resulting from overdue payables indicates a violation of contract, in which ethical 
customers are less likely to engage. As a result, suppliers count on the ethics and honesty of their 
customers when offering trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Guiso et al., 2004). In this regard, 
prior literature has confirmed that religiosity is a major source of morality and ethical behavior 
(see Vitell (2009) for a review of empirical literature). According to McGuire et al. (2012), when 
religion is central to a person’s self-identity, ethically questionable behaviors generate higher 
levels of cognitive and emotional discomfort, which motivates religious adherents to align their 
behavior with role expectations. Hence, customers who receive trade credit in a more religious 
country are more likely to pay their payables in a timely manner. Moreover, from the social norm 
perspective, religiosity, which serves as a form of social norm, constrains the opportunistic 
behaviors of customers who obtain trade credit. Stavrova and Siegers (2014) argue that people 
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who behave in accordance with social norms may receive higher levels of social recognition and 
respect. Therefore, customers in a more religious country would be less likely to default on their 
trade credits because violating social norms would receive less social respect or additional social 
sanctions. 
To summarize, customers in more religious countries have a stronger demand for trade 
credit given their risk aversion behaviors. Correspondingly, suppliers are more likely to supply 
trade credit to customers because religiosity constrains customers’ defaulting tendency on accounts 
payables. Based on the above discussions, we hypothesize the following:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms from more religious countries use more trade credit in 
transactions than firms from less religious countries. 
We acknowledge that the opposite prediction is also likely.2 Since supplier firms are also 
risk-averse, they are reluctant to offer trade credit to customers due to concerns about default risk. 
It is also possible that customers do not demand extensive trade credit as they are relatively 
confident that any product defaults can be dealt with swiftly by the suppliers in highly religious 
countries. Therefore, this prediction implies that trade credit is low in more religious countries due 
to trust about product quality. We retain the directional hypothesis above, and we explicitly test 
the role of trust in the subsequent section.  
 
2.2 Moderating roles of institutional factors across countries 
The legal, political, social, and cultural environments of a country influence a firm’s choice 
to demand cash payment upon delivery or to sell on credit (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; 
Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009). We consider the following three country-level institutional factors. 
                                                          
2 We thank an anonymous referee for making this excellent point. 
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First, the quality of information disclosure affects trade credit use (Dai and Yang, 2015). Countries 
with stringent disclosure requirements provide an information level playing field for all parties. 
When there is less information asymmetry between suppliers and customers (Smith, 1987; Aktas 
et al., 2012), risk-averse customers do not demand as much trade credit as long as they can better 
assess the product quality. As such, religiosity will play a less significant role in explaining trade 
credit use.3 Second, strong creditor rights in a country protect lenders from appropriations by 
borrowers. Furthermore, creditor rights are related to the power of secured lenders in the 
bankruptcy process granted by the laws and regulations of a country. Stiglitz (1999) points out that 
legal variables (e.g., creditor rights) and extra-legal variables (e.g., social trust) could be substitutes 
or complements. While stronger creditor rights drive the use of trade credit, it is unclear how 
creditor rights moderates the relation between religiosity and trade credit use. Similarly, while 
social trust may foster the prevalence of trade credit (Guiso et al., 2004; Wu et al., 2013), social 
trust may enhance or mitigate the influence of religiosity on trade credit. To summarize, we expect 
the disclosure requirement to mitigate that the relationship between trade credit use and religiosity. 
However, we do not have a directional prediction on how creditor rights (or social trust) affect the 
relationship between trade credit use and religiosity, so we leave the latter two hypotheses below 
in null forms. We hypothesize the following: 
H2a: A high level of disclosure quality in a country mitigates the association between trade 
credit use and religiosity. 
H2b: A high level of protection of creditor rights in a country does not affect the 
association between trade credit use and religiosity.  
                                                          
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point.  
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H2c: A high level of social trust in a country does not affect the association between trade 
credit use and religiosity. 
 
3. Data and Research Design 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
We start with the international data on participation in formal religious services and 
personal prayer and on religious beliefs from the World Values Survey (WVS). There were five 
cross-country surveys carried out between 1981 and 2008, including 1981–84, 1990–93, 1995–97, 
1999–2004, and 2005–2008 (Díez-Medrano, 2009). Next, we merge the above-mentioned 
religiosity data with firm-level financial data from Compustat Global and Compustat North 
America from 1989 to 2012. 4  Following Pevzner et al. (2015), we match the most recent 
religiosity values with our firm-level financial data. We further exclude firms with missing 
accounting and financial data, firms with missing Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, 
and firms in financial service, mining, and utilities industries (i.e., SIC codes between 1000 and 
1400, between 4900 and 4999, and between 6000 and 6999). We also remove all observations with 
foreign sales, as well as firms that are cross-listed in multiple countries. Finally, since the 
religiosity survey data are not available for all countries across all years, we restrict our sample to 
countries that have no less than 50 observations. These filters yield a sample of 248,824 firm-year 
observations across 53 countries over the period from 1989 to 2012. 
                                                          
4 Our analyses start at 1989 due to limited country coverage prior to 1989; as such, we do not utilize the 1981-82 
WVS data. The time series in the panel data typically span twelve years, with a minimum of four years of data (for 
countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Tunisia), and a maximum of twenty four years of data (for countries 
including Chile and Mexico).  
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Definitions and sources for all the variables used in the main analyses and the robustness 
tests are summarized in the Appendix. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers.5  
 
3.2 International data on religiosity 
Following prior literature (Cornwall et al., 1986; Parboteeah et al., 2008; McGuire et al., 
2012), we define religiosity by (1) its cognitive (knowing) element, which is related to religious 
beliefs or religious knowledge; (2) its affective (feeling) element, which motivates people to have 
emotional feelings about religion; and (3) its behavioral (doing) element, which emphasizes church 
attendance, personal prayer or regular religious donations. Accordingly, we use three different 
questions in the WVS: (1) Would you say you are a religious person? (2) How important is religion 
in your life? And (3) How often do you attend religious services? Using the data from the WVS, 
we construct country-level variables corresponding to the above three dimensions of religiosity. 
The variable Belief is the proportion of respondents who indicate their affiliations with religions. 
The variable Important is the proportion of respondents who indicate that the religion is important 
to them. And the variable Attend is the proportion of respondents who indicate that they attend 
religious services more than once a month. Our primary religiosity measure, Religiosity, is 
constructed following a factor analysis that combines the three dimensions of religiosity into one 
measure of the overall religiosity (McGuire et al., 2012). In Section 5, we present results using a 
number of alternative religiosity measures as the robustness check.  
 
3.3 Measures of trade credit use 
                                                          
5 In untabulated robustness tests, we conduct all the tests again using the quantile regressions and obtain similar results. 
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To measure the extent of firm-level trade credit use, we adopt two proxies in the paper. 
First, following prior literature (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Cunat, 2007), we use the variable, 
accounts receivable (AR), which is defined as trade receivable divided by total assets. Following 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), we use the other variable, ARTurnover, which is defined 
as the ratio of total sales over accounts receivable. 
 
3.4 Empirical models  
Our multivariate OLS regression model testing the effect of religiosity on trade credit use 
is specified as follows: 
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where the dependent variable, Trade Credit, is measured by accounts receivable (AR) or accounts 
receivable turnover (ARTurnover). To test H1, we analyze the coefficient on Religiosity. To the 
extent that managers of firms from countries with strong religious and social norms are more likely 
to extend trade credit, we expect a positive (negative) and significant coefficient on Religiosity 
when the dependent variable is AR (ARTurnover).  
In addition to our variable of interest, we also control for factors that prior research (e.g., 
Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Aktas et al., 2012) suggests are associated with trade credit use. 
Specifically, we control for firm size (Size), which is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Larger firms have better management of their cash conversion cycle when compared with smaller 
firms, and they also have better access to financial markets. Therefore, larger firms can demand 
less but extend more trade credit to customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Atanasova, 2007). We 
also control for several operating performance measures, including return on assets (ROA), the 
ratio of net sales over net fixed assets (NSNFA), sales growth rate (SalesGrowth). Inventory 
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management is an important factor to influence trade credit. To reach an optimal inventory level 
and avoid the buildup of inventory, firms with cost advantages in financing receivables may find 
it optimal to extend additional credit to customers (Emery, 1987). Thus, we control for inventory 
turnover (InvTurnover). The decision to offer trade credit can also be motivated by product market 
competition. Thus, we control for industry-specific Herfindahl index based on firm sales (HHI). 
Moreover, over-levered or distressed firms tend to be financially constrained, thereby causing 
these firms to reduce investment in net trade credit by collecting accounts receivables, tightening 
credit terms, or stretching credit terms granted by suppliers (Molina and Preve, 2009). We 
therefore control for financial leverage (Lev), defined as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and 
debt in current liabilities over total assets, and the cash ratio (Cash), defined as the ratio of cash 
and short-term investments over total assets. Finally, we include the variable AP, measured as the 
ratio of accounts payable to total liabilities. 
In addition to firm-level control variables, we include country-level characteristics, 
including macroeconomic conditions and financial market environment, which prior research 
suggests are determinants of trade credit (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). Following 
Beck et al. (2008), we include the development of private credit (PrivCredit), defined as the ratio 
of private credit to gross domestic product, where both values are at the country level. We also 
include the natural logarithm of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (LnGDP), as well 
as the growth rate of the real GDP per capita (GDPGrowth). Moreover, we control for an inflation 
rate of the GDP deflator (Inflation), and country-level openness (Openness), which is defined as 
the ratio of the sum of exports and imports over GDP. All these annual data are obtained from the 
World Development Indicators.  
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The pooled OLS model includes industry and country fixed effects to account for 
heterogeneity in trade credit across industries and countries. We also include year fixed effects to 
control for macroeconomic effects. In addition, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the country and year levels (Petersen, 2009).  
To examine the moderating effect of institutional factors across countries, we use the 
following three variables: Disclosure, CreditorRights, and Trust. To examine the impact of 
country-level disclosure quality on the relationship between religiosity and trade credit use (H2a), 
We use the variable Disclosure, which is the index of accounting disclosure quality based on 
aggregate annual financial statement disclosure scores from the Center for International Financial 
Analysis and Research (CIFAR, 1995). We expect a negative and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term Disclosure × Religiosity as predicted by H2a. 
To test H2b, we introduce the variable CreditorRights, which measures the aggregate 
creditor rights for each country (Djankov et al., 2007).6 We expect no significant loading on the 
interaction term CreditorRights × Religiosity. 
To test H2c, we add the variable Trust, which measures the extent of social trust in a 
country (Pevzner et al., 2015). According to H2c, we expect no significant loading on the 
interaction term Trust × Religiosity. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Table I reports descriptive statistics of country and firm-level variables across the sample 
countries. The United States, with 65,831 observations, is the most widely represented country in 
                                                          
6 Note that creditor rights data refer to the rights of secured creditors and the data are time-invariant.  
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the sample. Other countries have significantly fewer observations and combined they account for 
approximately 74% of the sample observations. Table I shows that on average approximately 52% 
of the population in each sample country are affiliated with religions; 81% report that religion is 
important in their daily life; and 10% attend religious services on a monthly basis. Based on the 
composite measure of religiosity (Religiosity), Nigeria, Morocco, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Egypt 
are the most religious countries, while China, Japan, Estonia, Sweden and Germany are the least 
religious countries in our sample. For the full sample, the average fraction of accounts receivable 
on total assets is 20%. Mean values of accounts receivables as a percentage of total assets vary 
widely across countries, from 6% in Saudi Arabia to 37% in Morocco. Pakistan (Morocco) also 
holds the highest (the lowest) accounts receivable turnover ratios.  
The country-level statistics in Table I further indicate unequal economic development 
across the sample. While Qatar has the highest GDP per capita (LnGDP = 11.26) as well as the 
fastest GDP growth, India is the poorest country in terms of GDP per capita (LnGDP = 6.72). 
Hong Kong’s ratio of total import and export to its GDP (Openness = 4.06) is nearly 17 times of 
Japan and United States (Openness = 0.24). We also notice that the group of five most religious 
countries and the other group of five least religious countries exhibit certain distinct institutional 
factors. For example, the most religious countries have lower ratios of private credit to their 
economies (average PrivCredit = 0.508 vs. 1.046 for the least religious countries). Those most 
religious countries have stronger creditor rights protection (average CreditorRights = 2.2) 
compared to an average of 1.6 for the five least religious countries. However, we do not see a 
significant difference between the most religious countries and the least religious ones in terms of 
disclosure quality and social trust.  
Table II presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main regression model. 
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Standard deviations from Table II confirm the statistics from Table I that there are considerable 
variations for trade credit use and religiosity across countries. Moreover, the statistics show that 
accounts receivables on average account for 20% of total assets. 
Table III reports Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients for all the variables used in the 
main regressions. Not surprisingly, Belief, Important, and Attend are highly correlated to one 
another. Panel A further shows that each component of religiosity is significantly correlated with 
the composite measure, Religiosity. Panel B shows that the two proxies for trade credit use (AR 
and ARTurnover) are negatively correlated with each other at the 1% level. We find that AR 
(ARTurnover) is positively (negatively) correlated with Religiosity at the 1% level. Moreover, 
Religiosity is negatively correlated with a country’s protection of creditor rights but positively 
correlated with a country’s disclosure quality. 
 
4.2 Multivariate regressions results 
Table IV reports the coefficient estimates of regressing the trade credit proxies 
(ARTurnover and AR) on the composite religiosity measure, after controlling for various firm- and 
country-level characteristics. Models (1) and (2) present the multivariate results when accounts 
receivable turnover (ARTurnover) is the dependent variable while Models (3) and (4) use AR as 
the dependent variable. In Model (1), we find a significantly negative association between 
Religiosity and ARTurnover at the 10% level. The result supports that firms in more religious 
countries extend more trade credit to customers. In Model (2), we also find a significantly negative 
relation between Religiosity and ARTurnover at the 1% level, after controlling for the additional 
country-level and firm-level variables. Models (3) and (4) yield significantly positive associations 
when AR is used as the dependent variable. These results support our first hypothesis that firms in 
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countries with stronger religion and social norms use more trade credit. The effect of Religiosity 
is also economically sizable. According to Model (3), holding the other explanatory variables 
constant at their means, a one standard deviation increase in Religiosity would increase accounts 
receivables by about 1.7%. Thus the results from all models confirm our main hypothesis H1. 
Across the four models, the firm-level control variables generally exhibit expected 
coefficient signs. The coefficient on Cash loads positively for ARTurnover while loading 
negatively for AR at the 1% significance level. The result is consistent with the notion that firms 
that extend more trade credit tend to be cash constrained. It also supports the notion that customers 
are reluctant to repay financially troubled suppliers (Giannetti et al., 2011). As expected, we find 
the coefficient on InvTurnover positive and significant across four models, consistent with the 
notion that suppliers push out inventory to customers and record higher level of accounts 
receivables. Moreover, firms’ profitability (ROA) is positively associated with both AR and 
ARTurnover. In addition, higher leveraged firms have less use of trade credit. However, 
inconsistent with our expectation, the coefficients on Size suggests that larger firms are less willing 
to extend trade credit; in contrast, smaller firms, compete with larger ones by offering more trade 
credit to their customers. 
Consistent with the results in Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), we find that GDP 
per capita is significantly negatively associated with AR at the 1% levels, indicating that firms in 
less developed economies tend to sell more on credit. The coefficient on PrivCredit is negative at 
the 10% significance level for AR, suggesting that firms in countries with more developed financial 
markets provide less trade credit. This result supports the finding from prior literature that trade 
credit is complementary to bank credit (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2001). The adjusted R2s of all models are about 40%, suggesting good model fits. 
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4.3 The moderating effect of institutional factors 
In Table V, we report the moderating effects of country-level characteristics on the 
relationship between religiosity and trade credit use (including ARTurnover and AR). Panel A 
(Panel B) presents the results when ARTurnover (AR) is the dependent variable. Since both panels 
render qualitatively similar results, we focus on Panel B. Panel B, Model (1) presents results when 
the country-level disclosure quality interacts with religiosity. Consistent with our prediction, the 
coefficient on Disclosure × Religiosity is negative at the 1% level, suggesting that better disclosure 
quality mitigates the significance of religiosity in driving trade credit use. 
Panel B, Model (2) examines the impact of the creditor protection on the relation between 
religiosity and trade credit; we include CreditorRights and its interaction term with Religiosity in 
Eq. (1). The interaction term CreditorRights × Religiosity is positive and significant, indicating 
that creditor protection enhances the positive association between religiosity and trade credit use. 
Our H2c is tested in Panel B, Model (3). Specifically, we test the association between religiosity 
and trade credit proxies in the presence of social trust in each country. Results show that the higher 
level of trust enhances the positive association between religiosity and trade credit use. 
Finally, across both panels, our previous findings on the relationship between religiosity 
and trade credit use remain unchanged, reducing concerns that our results are driven by the 
omission of country-level institutional factors. 
 
5. Sensitivity Tests and Results 
5.1 Tests addressing the omitted correlated variable issue 
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Our models and empirical results are likely to suffer from endogeneity issues. Roberts and 
Whited (2013) list three sources of endogeneity: simultaneity bias, measurement errors, and 
omitted explanatory variables. First, the simultaneity bias could occur if trade credit use and 
religiosity are determined in equilibrium, with trade credit policies influencing a country’s 
religiosity. However, religiosity for a country should be relatively stable over time, with changes 
taking place on order of centuries (North, 1991; Williamson, 2000). Hence, it is unlikely that trade 
credit decisions at the firm level drive national-level religiosity. Second, we will show in Sections 
5.3 and 5.4 that our main findings are not sensitive to making alternative sampling requirements 
or using alternative measures religiosity. The remaining issue is about omitted explanatory 
variables, which we focus on in this section. We investigate whether the associations found in the 
previous sections are causally linked. In other words, does the religious make-up of the population 
cause firms to behave in a certain way, or do any omitted correlated variables explain the 
association between religiosity and trade credit use?  
To answer this question, we conduct two different tests. First, we implement a two-stage-
least-squares (2SLS) regression by including instrumental variables at the first-stage regression. 
This approach removes the estimation bias caused by an unspecified omitted correlated variable if 
the instruments are uncorrelated with this omitted variable and are sufficiently correlated with the 
endogenous elements of the variable of interest (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002). During the first stage, 
we follow Barro and McCleary (2003) and Durlauf et al. (2012) in choosing the first-stage 
instrument variables. These variables represent shares of adherence to different religions in each 
of our sample countries. The WVS includes data from censuses and surveys in which people are 
asked to state the religion, if any, to which they adhere. The eight types of religious adherents are 
Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant (including Anglican), Jewish, Muslim, Hindu (including Jains and 
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Sikhs), Buddhist; and other Christians. 7  For each religion, we extract the proportion of the 
population within each country who expressed adherence to the religion. In addition, following 
Durlauf et al. (2012), StateReligion equals to 1 if a state religion was present in a sample country 
in 1970; RegulationReligion captures the presence of state regulations on religions in 1970. 
Pluralism measures the religious pluralism and is calculated as one minus a Herfindahl index 
showing population fractions of adherents to nine different religions.  
Table VI, Panel A reports the 2SLS regression results. Column (1) shows the first-stage 
regression results at the country levels. The coefficients for religious adherence are significant, 
confirming that the instrument variables are correlated with religiosity.8 Overall, the significant 
coefficients on the variables suggest that our instruments satisfy the relevance requirement. The 
partial adjusted R2 attributed to our instruments is 93%, statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Untabulated tests further indicate that these instrument variables are not significantly correlated 
with the accounts receivable variables. The second stage regresses the proxies for trade credit use 
(ARTurnover and AR) on the predicted values of religiosity obtained from the first stage and other 
control variables. The results from the second stage regression are similar to those reported in 
Table IV. Specifically, the coefficients on the fitted religiosity measure bear significant and 
expected signs in both specifications. Overall, the results confirm that our model linking trade 
credit proxies and religiosity is robust to the issue of omitted explanatory variables. 
Separately, we consider an exogenous shock setting related to the fall of the Iron Curtain 
and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, after which many of the Central 
and Eastern European nations experienced upsurges in religious affiliations among their 
                                                          
7 Other Christians encompass independent Christian churches, unaffiliated Christians, and “marginal Christians”, 
such as Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
8  We exclude the following four variables, including Orthodox, Protestant, Muslim, and OtherChristians, as 
instrument variables as the coefficients of these variables are insignificant in the first-stage regression.  
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populations (Pew Research Center, 2017). We expect that exogenous shocks to religiosity will 
lead to significant increases in trade credit use. Due to the constraint of religiosity data availability, 
we focus on two specific countries, Bulgaria and Romania. According to the World Value Survey 
(WVS), religious believers in Bulgaria and Romania rose by 9% and 13%, respectively, from 1994 
to 2004. We focus on the subsample of Bulgaria and Romania between 1994 and 2004. Table VI, 
Panel B shows that Religiosity is negatively associated with ARTurnover and positively associated 
with AR. Both coefficients are significant at the 10% levels, likely due to the much smaller 
subsample size. Thus, the subsample results based on the exogenous shock setting are consistent 
with our main results as reported in Table IV.  
 
5.2 Results from country-level regressions 
In Table VII, we report the country-level regression results that test the relation between 
religiosity and trade credit use. The country-level regression utilizes aggregate values of firm-
specific data in each country. Moreover, to proxy for the amount of domestic trade in a country, 
we multiply the aggregate accounts receivable by a local-trade weight, expressed as (1- exports to 
GDP ratio). Similarly, we multiply the aggregate sales by the local-trade weight.9 The results in 
Table VII remain substantially the same as the main results in Table IV.  
 
5.3 Results of subsample analyses  
To test the sensitivity of our results, we repeat the main regressions on various subsamples. 
Table VIII, Panel A shows the regression results when observations from the United States or 
countries with fewer than 1000 observations are excluded. Results remain substantially the same 
                                                          
9 We thank one reviewer for making this excellent point. 
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as the results in Table IV since the coefficients on Religiosity remain significant and consistent 
with predicted signs. In Table VIII, Panel B, we divide the sample based on whether a country has 
been surveyed only once or multiple times. As shown in Panel B, the religiosity data for most 
countries are time-variant. Again, we obtain consistent results from these subsample analyses.  
 
5.4 Results using alternative religiosity measures 
We test the robustness of our results to alternative measures of religiosity. In Table IX, we 
report the results using a simple average of the three variables, including Belief, Important and 
Attend (McGuire et al., 2012), as well as each of the three components of religiosity. Most of the 
alternative measures of religiosity remain significantly associated with the proxies of trade credit 
use with the only exception by the variable Attend, which is negatively yet insignificantly 
associated with both measures of trade credit use. 
Moreover, we test the role of different religious beliefs on trade credit use. We use the same 
religious adherence variables as in the 2SLS regressions. Results in Table X reveal that different 
religious adherences exhibit varying influence on trade credit use. Specifically, we find that the 
coefficients on both Catholic and Orthodox are negative and significant at the 1% levels when 
ARTurnover is the dependent variable, which is consistent with the notion that these religious 
customers are risk-averse and Catholic and Orthodox suppliers are willing to offer trade credit 
(Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Kumar, 2009). In contrast, Jewish and Buddhist adherents are less 
dependent on debt and thus are less willing to extend trade credit (Audretsch et al., 2013). Finally, 
consistent with Warner et al. (2011), and Baele et al. (2014), customers adhering to Muslim and 
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Hindu religions are willing to use trade credit.10 Overall, these results again confirm the effect of 
religiosity on trade credit use, although there appear to be significant differences across religions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Adopting country- and firm-level data from 53 countries, we find that national religiosity 
is an important driver for the cross-country variations of trade credit use. Specifically, after 
controlling for firm- and country-level factors as well as industry and year effects, we show that 
trade credit use is higher in more religious countries. Moreover, both creditor rights and social 
trust in a country enhance the positive association between religiosity and trade credit use, while 
national-level disclosure quality mitigates the aforementioned positive association. These results 
are robust to alternative measures of religiosity and trade credit use, and potential endogeneity 
concerns. Overall, our study shows that religiosity, as another extra-legal institution, fosters the 
prevalence of trade credit for firms that likely face restrictions in formal financing. It is important 
to note that the effect of religiosity on trade credit use is over and above that of the previously 
documented country- and firm-level determinants of trade credit use. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 The non-interest-bearing feature makes it acceptable for Muslims to engage in trade credit.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Description Data source 
Measures of religion/religiosity  
Belief The proportion of respondents who indicate that they are affiliated with a religion based on the question in 
the WVS, “Would you say you are a religious person?” 
World Value Survey  
Important The proportion of respondents who indicate that the religion is important to them based on the question in 
the WVS, “How important is religion in your life?” 
World Value Survey  
Attend The proportion of respondents who indicate that they attend religious services more than once a month based 
on the question in the WVS, “How often do you attend religious services?” 
World Value Survey  
Religiosity The principal component of the three religiosity variables Belief, Important, and Attend.  
ReligiosityAvg The average value of the three religiosity variables Belief, Important, and Attend.  
Catholic The proportion of respondents who indicate that they belong to Catholic based on the question in the WVS, 
“Do you belong to a religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one.” 
World Value Survey  
Orthodox The proportion of respondents who indicate that they belong to Orthodox based on the question in the WVS, 
“Do you belong to a religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one.” 
World Value Survey  
Protestant The proportion of respondents who indicate that they belong to Protestant based on the question in the WVS, 
“Do you belong to a religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one.” 
World Value Survey  
OtherChristians The proportion of respondents who indicate that they belong to Other Christians based on the question in the 
WVS, “Do you belong to a religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one.” 
World Value Survey  
Jewish The proportion of respondents who indicate that they belong to Jewish based on the question in the WVS, 
“Do you belong to a religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one.” 
World Value Survey  
Muslim The proportion of respondents who indicate that they belong to Muslim based on the question in the WVS, 
“Do you belong to a religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one.” 
World Value Survey  
Hindu The proportion of respondents who indicate that they belong to Hindu based on the question in the WVS, 
“Do you belong to a religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one.” 
World Value Survey  
Buddhist The proportion of respondents who indicate that they belong to Buddhist based on the question in the WVS, World Value Survey  
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“Do you belong to a religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one.” 
Firm-level variables  
ARTurnover The ratio of total sales over accounts receivable. Compustat 
AR Accounts receivable scaled by total assets. Compustat 
AP Accounts payable scaled by total liabilities. Compustat 
Size Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat 
ROA Return on assets, measured as the ratio of net income to total assets. Compustat 
NSNFA The ratio of net sales over net fixed assets. Compustat 
InvTurnover Inventory turnover, measured as the ratio of total sales over total inventory. Compustat 
Lev Financial leverage, measured as long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, and then divided by total 
assets.  
Compustat 
Cash Cash ratio, measured as the sum of cash and short-term investments, and then divided by total assets.  Compustat 
SalesGrowth Sales growth rate, measured as sales revenue minus sales revenue in a previous year, and then divided by 
sales revenue in a previous year. 
Compustat 
HHI Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of the squared market shares based on firm sales for each industry 
classified by 3-digit SIC codes. 
Compustat 
Country-level variables  
Openness The sum of exports and imports, then scaled by GDP. World Development 
Indicators (2012) 
LnGDP Real GDP per capita, measured as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. World Development 
Indicators (2012) 
Inflation The inflation rate of the GDP deflator. World Development 
Indicators (2012) 
PrivCredit The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to gross domestic product. World Development 
Indicators (2012) 
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GDPGrowth The growth rate of the real GDP per capita. World Development 
Indicators (2012) 
CreditorRights Creditor rights index, which ranges from 0 to 4 and aggregates creditor rights in the following way: (1) the 
country imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) 
secured creditors can gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved 
(no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from 
the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its 
property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 
(strong creditor rights). Missing values are supplemented with the sample mean. 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
Disclosure Index of accounting disclosure quality, which is based on aggregate annual financial statement disclosure 
scores from the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR, 1995). Five aspects of 
corporate reporting are considered: (1) financial disclosure intensity, (2) governance disclosure intensity, (3) 
accounting principles used to measure financial disclosures, (4) timeliness of financial disclosures, and (5) 
audit quality of financial disclosures. The index ranges between 0 (lowest disclosure) to 1 (highest 
disclosure). Missing values are supplemented with the sample mean. 
CIFAR (1995) 
Trust The proportion of respondents in each country year who agree on the question “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
World Value Survey  
Additional variables used in the 1st stage regression in the 2SLS regressions  
StateReligion An indicator variable that equals 1 for the presence of state religion in 1970, and 0 otherwise.  Durlauf et al. (2012) 
RegulationReligion  An indicator variable that equals 1 for the presence of state regulation in religion in 1970, and 0 otherwise. Durlauf et al. (2012) 
Pluralism Religious pluralism, measured as one minus the Herfindahl index, which is the sum of the squares of the 
population fractions belonging to each of nine major categories: Buddhist, Catholic, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, 
Protestant, other Eastern religions, Orthodox, and other religions.  
Barro and McCleary 
(2003) 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics of Country- and Firm-Level Characteristics across Sample Countries 
 
This table presents the mean values of country- and firm-level characteristics across sample countries. The variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Country/Region N % Religiosity Belief Important Attend AR-
Turnover 
AR Openness LnGDP Inflation Priv- 
Credit 
GDP- 
Growth 
Creditor- 
Rights 
Disclo-
sure 
Trust 
Argentina 750 0.30 1.03 0.75 0.87 0.07 6.60 0.19 0.32 8.88 0.16 0.15 0.03 1 0.68 0.73 
Australia 4,714 1.89 0.74 0.49 0.69 0.04 10.87 0.18 0.41 10.66 0.04 1.16 0.03 3 0.80 0.90 
Bahrain 51 0.02 1.22 0.76 0.97 0.33 9.05 0.12 1.22 9.96 0.02 0.69 0.03 0 0.72 0.93 
Brazil 1,981 0.80 1.23 0.85 0.97 0.22 6.35 0.18 0.25 8.88 0.71 0.47 0.04 1 0.56 0.88 
Bulgaria 62 0.02 0.87 0.57 0.84 0.01 7.74 0.18 1.12 8.51 0.08 0.50 0.07 2 0.72 0.80 
Canada 5,495 2.21 1.01 0.72 0.88 0.07 10.86 0.16 0.73 10.35 0.03 1.47 0.03 1 0.75 0.90 
Chile 1,683 0.68 0.99 0.63 0.92 0.08 5.34 0.18 0.66 8.92 0.06 0.80 0.04 2 0.78 0.83 
China 22,635 9.10 0.43 0.16 0.53 0.01 9.21 0.17 0.50 7.85 0.04 1.18 0.10 2 0.72 0.97 
Colombia 123 0.05 1.07 0.67 0.97 0.13 12.24 0.09 0.36 8.42 0.10 0.41 0.04 0 0.58 0.86 
Cyprus 243 0.10 0.99 0.66 0.92 0.05 7.88 0.19 1.07 10.30 0.03 2.47 0.02 0 0.72 0.86 
Egypt 179 0.07 1.31 0.94 1.00 0.24 14.08 0.12 0.59 7.28 0.09 0.49 0.06 2 0.72 0.77 
Estonia 51 0.02 0.60 0.32 0.65 0.01 16.80 0.13 1.50 9.51 0.03 0.09 0.01 0 0.72 0.94 
Finland 791 0.32 0.88 0.57 0.84 0.02 7.40 0.22 0.75 10.48 0.02 0.67 0.04 1 0.83 0.92 
France 2,596 1.04 0.73 0.46 0.71 0.02 5.13 0.29 0.54 10.55 0.02 0.84 0.02 0 0.78 0.82 
Germany 6,282 2.52 0.64 0.42 0.62 0.01 9.12 0.21 0.70 10.52 0.01 0.98 0.01 3 0.67 0.80 
Hong Kong 7,109 2.86 0.69 0.24 0.84 0.05 9.13 0.17 4.06 10.33 0.01 1.61 0.05 4 0.73 0.90 
Hungary 110 0.04 0.72 0.47 0.68 0.02 6.69 0.21 1.31 9.16 0.07 0.42 0.03 1 0.72 0.77 
India 25,306 10.17 1.11 0.73 0.94 0.18 9.12 0.21 0.41 6.72 0.06 0.41 0.07 2 0.61 0.88 
Indonesia 1,895 0.76 1.21 0.73 1.00 0.30 12.12 0.16 0.61 7.06 0.13 0.24 0.05 2 0.72 0.94 
Italy 1,031 0.41 1.13 0.85 0.93 0.07 3.52 0.28 0.52 10.46 0.02 0.76 0.01 2 0.66 0.88 
Japan 53,168 21.37 0.54 0.22 0.65 0.02 10.14 0.24 0.24 10.49 -0.01 1.93 0.01 2 0.71 0.91 
Jordan 701 0.28 1.22 0.87 1.00 0.16 8.22 0.16 1.30 8.02 0.06 0.80 0.06 1 0.72 0.86 
Korea 7,026 2.82 0.81 0.33 0.83 0.19 6.92 0.18 0.87 9.85 0.02 1.27 0.04 3 0.68 0.91 
Kuwait 156 0.06 1.02 0.66 1.00 0.00 8.80 0.16 0.96 10.66 0.05 0.68 0.02 3 0.72 0.86 
Malaysia 6,643 2.67 1.32 0.73 1.00 0.51 6.12 0.21 1.79 8.93 0.05 1.07 0.05 3 0.79 0.93 
Mexico 1,445 0.58 1.09 0.72 0.96 0.13 9.40 0.14 0.53 8.85 0.10 0.20 0.03 0 0.71 0.81 
Morocco 378 0.15 1.36 0.86 1.00 0.45 3.42 0.37 0.76 7.85 0.02 0.59 0.05 1 0.72 0.84 
Netherlands 922 0.37 0.68 0.48 0.60 0.03 8.84 0.21 1.32 10.79 0.02 1.16 0.01 3 0.74 0.90 
New Zealand 533 0.21 0.72 0.44 0.68 0.05 14.81 0.16 0.59 10.26 0.03 1.32 0.02 4 0.80 0.93 
Nigeria 223 0.09 1.52 0.96 0.99 0.64 15.83 0.17 0.57 7.05 0.28 0.18 0.06 4 0.70 0.92 
Norway 589 0.24 0.74 0.43 0.76 0.01 7.47 0.22 0.71 10.82 0.05 0.72 0.03 2 0.75 0.97 
Pakistan 1,323 0.53 1.31 0.94 0.99 0.25 19.79 0.14 0.32 6.73 0.13 0.21 0.03 1 0.73 0.85 
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Peru 731 0.29 1.15 0.82 0.97 0.12 9.09 0.15 0.46 8.08 0.03 0.24 0.05 0 0.72 0.77 
Philippines 639 0.26 1.19 0.80 1.00 0.17 9.24 0.15 0.83 7.34 0.05 0.34 0.04 1 0.64 0.94 
Poland 2,755 1.11 1.16 0.88 0.96 0.07 6.59 0.26 0.80 9.30 0.03 0.42 0.04 1 0.72 0.91 
Qatar 68 0.03 1.19 0.94 1.00 0.00 8.43 0.10 0.92 11.26 0.02 0.43 0.12 0 0.72 0.97 
Romania 215 0.09 1.15 0.87 0.97 0.05 7.19 0.17 0.71 8.89 0.11 0.33 0.02 0 0.72 0.85 
Russia 931 0.37 0.86 0.59 0.80 0.01 9.64 0.16 0.53 9.08 0.14 0.38 0.04 2 0.72 0.81 
Saudi Arabia 117 0.05 1.07 0.64 1.00 0.14 10.94 0.06 0.67 9.07 0.05 0.28 0.04 3 0.72 0.88 
Singapore 2,122 0.85 0.95 0.51 0.94 0.12 8.89 0.21 3.69 10.77 0.01 1.04 0.06 3 0.79 0.98 
Slovenia 186 0.07 0.86 0.64 0.75 0.02 5.11 0.17 1.25 9.96 0.03 0.67 0.02 3 0.72 0.86 
South Africa 2,418 0.97 1.18 0.81 0.97 0.18 8.81 0.24 0.57 8.53 0.07 1.38 0.03 3 0.79 0.91 
Spain 1,640 0.66 0.81 0.53 0.75 0.05 5.11 0.23 0.52 10.01 0.03 1.22 0.02 2 0.72 0.85 
Sweden 2,697 1.08 0.62 0.32 0.69 0.01 8.12 0.22 0.85 10.76 0.02 1.05 0.02 1 0.83 0.94 
Switzerland 1,742 0.70 0.87 0.60 0.78 0.03 7.81 0.19 0.94 10.81 0.01 1.50 0.02 1 0.80 0.90 
Thailand 3,366 1.35 0.91 0.34 0.99 0.19 10.28 0.19 1.32 8.33 0.03 1.10 0.04 2 0.66 0.87 
Trinidad and Tobago 77 0.03 1.17 0.81 0.98 0.16 10.15 0.16 1.00 9.70 0.07 0.33 0.02 0 0.72 0.88 
Tunisia 87 0.03 1.20 0.65 0.99 0.38 8.36 0.21 1.03 8.34 0.04 0.71 0.02 0 0.72 0.75 
Turkey 1,578 0.63 1.14 0.79 0.97 0.13 7.90 0.23 0.50 8.92 0.20 0.34 0.04 2 0.58 0.83 
U.K. 4,984 2.00 0.78 0.47 0.75 0.07 10.77 0.20 0.55 10.66 0.03 1.66 0.02 4 0.85 0.86 
U.S. 65,831 26.46 1.11 0.77 0.93 0.13 14.81 0.17 0.24 10.53 0.02 1.66 0.03 1 0.76 0.92 
Venezuela 74 0.03 1.12 0.80 0.95 0.09 6.36 0.11 0.47 8.26 0.34 0.12 -0.01 3 0.72 0.83 
Vietnam 372 0.15 0.74 0.38 0.81 0.02 12.60 0.20 1.51 6.90 0.16 0.81 0.06 1 0.72 0.97 
                 
Total/Average 248,824 100.0
 
0.87 0.52 0.81 0.10 10.69 
 
0.20 0.59 9.62 0.03 1.35 0.04 1.84 0.73 0.91 
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Table II. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for the Full Sample 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main tests. For each variable, we 
report the mean, standard deviation, 1st quantile, median, and 3rd quantile. The variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
Measures of trade credit use 
AR_Turnover 247,644 10.691 19.510 3.647 5.564 8.791 
AR 248,512 0.196 0.137 0.094 0.175 0.271 
       
Firm-level characteristics 
Size 248,824 7.370 3.049 5.107 7.107 9.659 
ROA 248,824 -0.005 0.198 -0.002 0.027 0.065 
NSNFA 248,824 10.173 22.023 1.885 3.758 8.216 
InvTurnover 248,824 11.247 34.623 1.485 2.667 5.849 
Lev 248,824 0.236 0.195 0.063 0.212 0.365 
Cash  248,824 0.120 0.134 0.027 0.076 0.162 
SalesGrowth 248,824 0.192 0.697 -0.030 0.074 0.226 
AP 248,824 0.120 0.103 0.046 0.092 0.164 
HHI 248,824 0.157 0.201 0.035 0.077 0.187 
       
Measure of religiosity 
Religiosity 248,824 0.866 0.288 0.564 0.949 1.133 
ReligiosityAvg 248,824 0.477 0.162 0.307 0.526 0.626 
Belief 248,824 0.521 0.262 0.218 0.556 0.754 
Important 248,824 0.808 0.159 0.657 0.875 0.951 
Attend 248,824 0.100 0.108 0.017 0.094 0.135 
       
Country-level characteristics 
Openness 248,824 0.586 0.746 0.232 0.329 0.579 
LnGDP 248,824 9.621 1.410 8.732 10.360 10.554 
Inflation 248,824 0.033 0.299 0.006 0.021 0.039 
PrivCredit 248,824 1.346 0.561 1.028 1.395 1.824 
GDPGrowth 248,824 0.038 0.035 0.018 0.033 0.053 
CreditorRights 248,119 1.842 0.855 1.000 2.000 2.000 
Disclosure 247,288 0.835 0.202 0.800 0.800 1.000 
Trust 248,534 0.908 0.046 0.878 0.909 0.945 
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Table III. Pairwise Correlation of the Variables for the Full Sample 
 
This table presents the correlation matrices of the variables used in the main tests. Panel A presents the 
Pearson correlations among the religiosity measures. Panel B presents the Pearson correlations among the 
main test variables. The variables are defined in the Appendix. The correlation coefficients in bold are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 levels or better. 
 
Panel A: Pairwise Correlation of Religiosity Measures 
 
 Religiosity ReligiosityAvg Belief Important 
Religiosity     
ReligiosityAvg 0.99     
Belief 0.97 0.96   
Important 0.95 0.95 0.88  
Attend 0.76 0.77 0.61 0.67 
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Panel B: Pairwise Correlation of the Main Test Variables 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 ARTurnover 1.00                   
2 AR -0.37 1.00                  
3 Religiosity -0.05 0.08 1.00                 
4 Size 0.03 0.00 -0.44 1.00                
5 ROA 0.04 0.07 -0.05 0.24 1.00               
6 NSNFA 0.01 0.27 0.01 -0.16 -0.02 1.00              
7 InvTurnover 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.14 1.00             
8 Lev 0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.18 -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 1.00            
9 Cash  0.00 -0.11 -0.22 -0.11 -0.10 0.14 0.08 -0.36 1.00           
10 SalesGrowth 0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.10 -0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.05 1.00          
11 AP -0.01 0.48 -0.14 0.09 -0.06 0.22 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 1.00         
12 HHI 0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 1.00        
13 Openness -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.17 1.00       
14 LnGDP 0.06 0.01 -0.15 -0.04 -0.13 0.12 0.07 -0.12 0.14 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.00 1.00      
15 Inflation -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.09 1.00     
16 PrivCredit 0.06 0.00 -0.38 0.15 -0.09 0.06 0.04 -0.08 0.20 -0.07 0.06 -0.29 -0.11 0.75 -0.09 1.00    
17 GDPGrowth -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.11 0.09 -0.08 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.10 -0.03 -0.03 0.14 -0.62 0.04 -0.48 1.00   
18 CreditorRights -0.07 0.05 -0.35 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.12 0.55 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.09 1.00  
19 Disclosure 0.07 -0.08 0.18 -0.14 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.36 0.09 0.22 -0.09 0.41 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
20 Trust 0.04 -0.05 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.16 0.01 0.00 -0.26 0.00 0.06 -0.05 0.27 0.18 -0.09 0.32 
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Table IV. The Effect of Religiosity on Trade Credit Use  
 
This table presents the regression results of religiosity on trade credit use. Columns (1) and (2) use AR as 
the dependent variables, and Columns (3) and (4) use ARTurnover as the dependent variables. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. P-values based on robust t-statistics with standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at country and year levels are reported in the parentheses below coefficient 
estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Dept. Var. = ARTurnover 
Dept. Var. = 
ARTurnover Dept. Var. = AR Dept. Var. = AR 
Religiosity -1.381* -2.409*** 0.017*** 0.012* 
 (0.088) (0.002) (0.006) (0.069) 
Size 0.283*** 0.286*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 4.131*** 4.143*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NSNFA 0.011* 0.011* 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.000) (0.000) 
InvTunrover 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev 1.136** 1.153** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash 5.217*** 5.204*** -0.162*** -0.161*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SalesGrowth 0.782*** 0.781*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AP 2.104* 2.079* 0.517*** 0.517*** 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000) 
HHI -5.456*** -5.425*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Openness  0.327  0.004 
  (0.517)  (0.277) 
LnGDP  0.883***  -0.008*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Inflation  0.733***  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.864) 
PrivCredit  -0.744*  -0.005** 
  (0.071)  (0.022) 
GDPGrowth  -2.526  0.007 
  (0.127)  (0.559) 
Constant 14.138*** 7.014** 0.108*** 0.188*** 
 (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 242,485 242,485 243,326 243,326 
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.396 0.442 0.442 
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Table V. The Moderating Effect of Country-Level Characteristics on the Relation between 
Religiosity and Trade Credit Use 
 
This table presents the regression results of the moderating effects of country-level characteristics, 
including disclosure quality, creditor rights, and social trust on the relationship between religiosity and trade 
credit use. In Panel A, the dependent variable is ARTurnover; in Panel B, the dependent variable is AR. 
Firm and country characteristics are included in the regressions as in Eq. (1). All variables are defined in 
the Appendix. P-values based on robust t-statistics with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at country and year levels are reported in the parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, ** 
and * indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Dept. Var. = ARTurnover 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Country 
Characteristic  
= Disclosure 
Country 
Characteristic  
= CreditorRights 
Country 
Characteristic  
= Trust 
Country Characteristic × 
Religiosity 2.835** -0.317* -4.694* 
 (0.017) (0.075) (0.070) 
Country Characteristic -5.823 3.596*** 0.807 
 (0.274) (0.000) (0.647) 
Religiosity -2.283** -2.518*** -2.541*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) 
    
Firm characteristics  Yes Yes Yes 
Country characteristics  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 241,008 241,780 242,195 
Adjusted R2 0.397 0.396 0.397 
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Panel B: Dept. Var. = AR 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Country 
Characteristic  
= Disclosure 
Country 
Characteristic  
= CreditorRights 
Country 
Characteristic  
= Trust 
Country Characteristic × Religiosity -0.078*** 0.020*** 0.098*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country Characteristic 0.030 0.010* 0.002 
 (0.355) (0.080) (0.727) 
Religiosity 0.015*** 0.003 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.550) (0.985) 
    
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Country characteristics  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 241,790 242,621 242,389 
Adjusted R2 0.443 0.442 0.443 
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Table VI. The Effect of Religiosity on Trade Credit Use – Addressing the Endogeneity Concern 
 
This table presents the regression results that address the endogeneity concern. Panel A presents the 2-Stage 
Least Squares regression of religiosity on trade credit use. Column (1) reports the results for the 1st stage 
country-level regression. Columns (2) and (3) report the results of the 2nd stage regression using 
ARTurnover and AR as the dependent variables, respectively. Panel B reports the regression results based 
on a country-specific exogenous shock setting. All variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values based 
on robust t-statistics with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at country and year 
levels are reported in the parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that a coefficient 
is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 2-Stage Least Squares Regressions 
 
 Stage 1 Model   Stage 2 Model 
 (1)   (2) (3) 
Variable 
Dept. Var. = 
Religiosity                  
 
  
 
 
 Variable Dept. Var. = ARTurnover 
Dept. Var. = AR 
 
LnGDP 0.020* 
 ·Religiosity  -5.805*** 0.048*** 
 (0.074)   (0.010) (0.002) 
Pluralism 0.660***  Size 0.299*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
StateReligion -0.281***  ROA 4.207*** 0.082*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
RegulationReligion 0.104***  NSNFA 0.011* 0.001*** 
 (0.002)   (0.069) (0.000) 
Catholic 0.167**  InvTurnover 0.013*** 0.000*** 
 (0.049)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Jewish 2.775**  Lev 1.218** -0.025*** 
 (0.020)   (0.034) (0.000) 
Hindu 0.879***  Cash 5.433*** -0.163*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Buddhist 0.599**  SalesGrowth 0.768*** -0.003*** 
 (0.018)   (0.000) (0.000) 
   AP 2.123* 0.517*** 
    (0.074) (0.000) 
   HHI -5.593*** 0.015*** 
    (0.000) (0.001) 
   Openness -1.027** 0.021*** 
    (0.048) (0.000) 
   LnGDP 0.432 -0.004* 
    (0.135) (0.058) 
   Inflation 0.711*** 0.000 
    (0.000) (0.925) 
   PrivCredit -0.569 -0.010*** 
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    (0.173) (0.000) 
   GDPGrowth -2.000 -0.007 
    (0.260) (0.599) 
Constant  0.744***  Constant 3.579 0.200*** 
 (0.000)   (0.287) (0.000) 
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes 
Industry FE No   Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 481   228,611 229,447 
Adjusted R2 0.934 
 
  0.401 0.446 
 
Panel B: Tests utilizing an exogenous shock setting from Bulgaria and Romania 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Dept. Var. = ARTurnover Dept. Var. = AR 
Religiosity -4.005* 0.244* 
 (0.089) (0.060) 
   
Firm characteristics  Yes Yes 
Country characteristics  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 277 277 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.383 
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Table VII. The Effect of Religiosity on Trade Credit Use – Country-Level Regressions  
 
This table presents the country-level regression results of religiosity on trade credit use. Country-aggregate 
firm and country characteristics are included in the regressions as in Eq. (1). Both ARTurnoverTotal and 
ARTotal are the aggregate values of ARTurnover and AR in each country. All other variables are defined in 
the Appendix. P-values based on robust t-statistics with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the year level are reported in the parentheses below coefficient estimates.  ***, ** and * 
indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Dept. Var. = ARTurnoverTotal 
Dept. Var. = 
ARTurnoverTotal 
Dept. Var. = 
ARTotal 
Dept. Var. = 
ARTotal 
Religiosity -15.350*** -5.001** 0.051** 0.046** 
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.028) (0.033) 
     
Aggregate firm characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Country characteristics  No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 631 631 631 631 
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.783 0.631 0.827 
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Table VIII. The Effect of Religiosity on Trade Credit – Subsample Analyses  
 
This table presents the regression results of religiosity on trade credit use in various subsamples. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values based on robust t-statistics with standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at country and year levels are reported in the parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Subsamples that exclude either U.S. or countries having less than 1,000 observations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dept. Var. = ARTurnover 
Dept. Var. = 
ARTurnover Dept. Var. = AR Dept. Var. = AR 
Variable Sample with U.S. excluded 
Sample with 
Countries having 
less than 1,000 
observations 
excluded 
Sample with U.S. 
excluded 
Sample with 
Countries having 
less than 1,000 
observations 
excluded 
Religiosity -2.827*** -2.359*** 0.017** 0.013* 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.017) (0.064) 
     
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,850 233,195 178,982 233,970 
Adjusted R2 0.301 0.401 0.437 0.443 
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Panel B: Subsamples based on countries that were surveyed multiple times or once only   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dept. Var. = ARTurnover 
Dept. Var. = 
ARTurnover Dept. Var. = AR Dept. Var. = AR 
Variable 
Sample with 
countries surveyed 
more than once  
Sample with 
countries surveyed 
once only 
Sample with 
countries surveyed 
more than once  
Sample with 
countries surveyed 
once only 
Religiosity -2.611*** -3.624*** 0.016** 0.049*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.012) (0.000) 
     
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
Observations 231,280 11,205 232,061 11,265 
Adjusted R2 0.404 0.061 0.442 0.383 
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Table IX. The Effect of Religiosity on Trade Credit Use – Using Alternative Measures of Religiosity 
 
This table presents the regression results of religiosity on trade credit use using alternative measures of religiosity. The alternative measures include 
ReligiosityAvg, Belief, Important, and Attend. All variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values based on robust t-statistics with standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at country and year levels are reported in the parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * 
indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Dept. Var. = ARTurnover 
Dept. Var. = 
ARTurnover 
Dept. Var. = 
ARTurnover 
Dept. Var. = 
ARTurnover 
Dept. Var. = 
AR 
Dept. Var. = 
AR 
Dept. Var. = 
AR 
Dept. Var. = 
AR 
ReligiosityAvg -3.995***    0.021*    
 (0.006)    (0.079)    
Belief  -3.089**    0.022**   
  (0.015)    (0.030)   
Important   -4.652***    0.017*  
   (0.001)    (0.051)  
Attend    -0.115    0.015** 
    (0.914)    (0.036) 
Constant 7.615** 7.371** 8.438*** 7.183** 0.253*** 0.254*** 0.260*** 0.255*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 242,485 242,485 242,485 242,485 243,326 243,326 243,326 243,326 
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.360 0.360 0.360 0.360 
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Table X. The Effect of Different Religious Beliefs on Trade Credit Use  
 
This table presents the regression results of different religious beliefs on trade credit use. Columns (1) and 
(2) use ARTurnover and AR as the dependent variables, respectively. Firm and country characteristics are 
included in the regressions as in Eq. (1). All variables are defined in the Appendix. P-values based on robust 
t-statistics with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at country and year levels are 
reported in the parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that a coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Dept. Var. = ARTurnover Dept. Var. = AR 
Catholic -8.692*** 0.045*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Orthodox -41.066*** 0.092 
 (0.000) (0.252) 
Protestant -0.416 -0.002 
 (0.751) (0.825) 
Jewish 34.218*** -0.065 
 (0.000) (0.282) 
Muslim -20.940*** -0.097* 
 (0.000) (0.053) 
Hindu -20.815*** -0.193*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Buddhist 15.565*** 0.027 
 (0.000) (0.173) 
OtherChristians 184.987** 1.702** 
 (0.023) (0.035) 
Constant 4.078 0.288*** 
 (0.197) (0.000) 
   
Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Country characteristics Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 242,210 243,051 
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.442 
 
 
